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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to identify a means for achieving equilibrium between the U.S. 
requirements for military presence in the Persian Gulf and increasingly negative domestic 
perceptions of U.S. foreign policies from the societies, religious establishments, and 
governing bodies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.  Only by calibrating 
U.S. military presence with host GCC nation perceptions, can the United States support 
its national interests and foreign policies in the region.  The costs and benefits of the U.S. 
footprint in three critical GCC countries allow U.S. policymakers to examine the 
undesirable withdrawal of most U.S. military forces from Saudi Arabia in 2003, the 
comparatively successful U.S.-Bahrain bilateral security arrangement, and the potential to 
establish a substantive U.S. basing structure in Oman.  This understanding is fundamental 
to the United States’ ability to protect trade, continue prosecuting the Global War on 
Terrorism, promote democracy, and cultivate stability from within the region. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii




C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.............................................................4 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE.....................................................................................5 
II. SAUDI ARABIA CASE STUDY ................................................................................7 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION.......................................................................7 
B. BACKGROUND ON U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONSHIP.................8 
C. RATIONALE FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE....................................13 
D. SAUDI ARABIA’S DOMESTIC CONCERNS...........................................17 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................22 
III. BAHRAIN CASE STUDY ........................................................................................23 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION.....................................................................23 
B. BACKGROUND ON U.S.-BAHRAIN RELATIONSHIP .........................24 
C. RATIONALE FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE....................................27 
D. BAHRAIN’S DOMESTIC CONCERNS.....................................................31 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................35 
IV. OMAN CASE STUDY...............................................................................................37 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION.....................................................................37 
B. BACKGROUND OF U.S.-OMAN RELATIONSHIP................................38 
C. RATIONALE FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE....................................41 
D. OMAN’S DOMESTIC CONCERNS ...........................................................45 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY................................................................................48 
V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION............................................................................49 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION.....................................................................49 
B. RATIONALE FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GCC...........50 
C. DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE GCC ....................................52 
D. FUTURE PROSPECTS.................................................................................56 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................59 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................63 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Map of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries...............................................3 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Bahrain...............................................................................26 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis seeks to determine how to calibrate the requirements for U.S. military 
presence in the Persian Gulf with the domestic considerations of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) host states in the contemporary operating environment.  In this thesis, 
foreign policy is defined as a collective framework of decisions by a GCC state leader 
that affects the size, scope and nature of presence U.S. military forces assume in a 
respective GCC country.  Centrally located power is defined as the government of a GCC 
country that allows minimal or no political liberalization.  Oil rentier state is defined as a 
GCC country whose economy relies primarily on the export of oil for its subsistence and 
growth of its economy.  Fundamentalism refers to a certain way of practicing Islam based 
on its original tenets.  Footprint refers to the physical size and cultural impact U.S. forces 
have on the domestic population of a particular GCC country when they are deployed to 
that country.  The London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society defines civil 
society as the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes, and 
values. 
Primarily, historical research explains the dynamics of U.S. relationships with its 
GCC partners in this analysis.  The U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship has, by far, the most 
history and the strongest ties based on mutual economic and security interests.  These 
interests have ebbed and flowed through oil gluts and recessions and periods of conflict 
and peace.  Economic incentives and a robust external security guarantee alone, however, 
do not guarantee the protection of this long-standing bilateral relationship, which is, now 
more than ever, subject to domestic powers within the respective GCC regimes.  While 
the United States and Saudi Arabia still enjoy a relatively amenable relationship, 
increasingly negative perceptions of the United States by Saudi society and its clerical 
establishment threaten to continue undermining the prosperous bilateral relations the two 
countries once shared.  More importantly, these same tensions resonate throughout the 
Gulf and adversely affect other bilateral relationships the United States shares with GCC 
countries. 
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Temporary fluctuations in mutual economic and security advantages due to 
changes in supply and demand for oil, weapons, and the need for a security guarantee can 
not be abandoned as contributors to waning bilateral relations.  For example, the Arab oil 
embargoes of 1967 and 1973 contributed to periods of tense bilateral relations between 
the Gulf countries and the United States.  Similarly, the U.S. relationship with Israel has 
caused friction between the United States and its GCC partners.  In the broader 
framework of diplomacy and bilateral relationships, though, these events are only 
symptomatic of deeper underlying causes of tension between East and West, democratic 
and monarchical regimes, and Islam and Christianity.  This hypothesis attributes 
undesirable GCC foreign policy outcomes, from a U.S. perspective, to several 
compounding factors that exist within domestic GCC polities to varying degrees.  The 
hypothesis argues that a U.S. footprint in a GCC state will succeed or fail based on the 
degree to which the state exhibits the following characteristics:  centrality of power, 
susceptibility to manipulation from religious establishments, and level to which the state 
relies on oil to support its gross domestic product.  In other words, centrally powered 
GCC governments that tolerate the permeation of fundamental Islam over secular affairs 
while bearing the burdens of governing an oil rentier state, eventually become susceptible 
to foreign policy manipulation from the societies and religious establishments over which 
they rule.  Conversely, GCC states that diversify their economies, exercise more political 
liberalization, and carefully balance religious entities with secular foreign policy 
requirements are far less easily manipulated, and therefore, more conducive to U.S. 
military presence. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The size of the American footprint on the Arabian Peninsula creates several 
dilemmas with potentially devastating foreign policy outcomes for the United States and 
its GCC partners.  Generally, an overly intrusive U.S. presence in the Gulf lends itself to 
anti-Americanism, while a minimal, more transparent presence does not always 
sufficiently advance U.S. foreign policy requirements or adequately support military 
operations in the region.  Calibrating U.S. strategic interests with the domestic pressures 
from within the GCC states ensures that access to basing and other aspects of security 
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and trade cooperation remain protected.  In other words, the preservation and 
advancement of U.S. national interests as they relate to the Middle East, depends on the 
ability of the United States and its GCC partners to achieve equilibrium between the 
requirements for preserving security and protecting trade with the domestic political 
unrest that emerges from anti-Americanism in hosting GCC governments. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Map of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 
For the United States, critical strategic interests include the following:  the 
uninhibited global export of oil, free trade, access to basing, logistical support, force 
protection, and the promotion of democracy and stability.1  Access to Gulf airspace, pre-
positioned equipment, ports, and personnel staging areas also constitute several areas 
                                                 
1 These priorities are widely discussed in the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, the past two 
Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and various National Defense Strategies. 
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important to the implementation of U.S. foreign policy in the Gulf.  Moreover, the ability 
to sustain an effective counterterrorism partnership with GCC countries directly impacts 
the ability of the United States to conduct the Global War on Terror (GWOT) from 
abroad.  These critical pieces of security and trade cooperation become vulnerable when 
domestic pressure in host GCC countries rise and undermine these initiatives.  
For the GCC, an overwhelming U.S. presence in the Gulf countries magnifies the 
U.S. footprint in the region and often creates a climate that fosters anti-American 
sentiments toward the United States.  As a result, domestic pressures to eliminate U.S. 
forces from GCC countries force the GCC leaders to comply with the people or become 
susceptible to removal and overthrow.  Conventional wisdom suggests that monarchs act 
completely autonomously from the people over which they rule.  The truth, however, is 
that in the absence of a collective GCC security framework, Arab monarchs, like Saudi 
Arabia, capitulate to the domestic pressures unless they possess sufficient measures to 
mitigate them.  Bahrain and Oman seemingly possess some of the measures that enable 
the regimes to conduct their foreign policies more independently. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis emphasizes the different empirical outcomes pertaining to the U.S. 
footprint in three strategic GCC countries.  The comparative method evaluates three 
country case studies involving different GCC countries in the same region.  All three 
have comparable political systems, economies, and religious institutions to varying 
degrees.  Additionally, all three countries have hosted at one time or are hosting 
significant U.S. military forces.  The Saudi Arabia case study focuses on the particularly 
undesirable agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia to withdraw U.S. 
military forces from Saudi territory in 2003.  In contrast, the Bahrain case illuminates a 
comparatively successful bilateral security arrangement that the United States has shared 
with a GCC country.  The Oman case study evaluates the prospect for a more substantive 
bilateral security arrangement that includes long-term access to military basing.  In 
comparing the individual bilateral relationships between the United States and each 
respective GCC country that has prospered or diminished in terms of bilateral 
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arrangements, the thesis also seeks to develop prescriptive measures, which will assist 
policymakers to avoid repeating what happened in Saudi Arabia and to preserve the 
security arrangement in Bahrain.  Additionally, these prescriptive measures can inform a 
framework during initiatives to create a more robust U.S. presence in Oman.  The UAE 
has not historically based U.S. forces.  Kuwait’s motivations for supporting the U.S. are 
obvious given the U.S. defense of Kuwait during the first Gulf War.  Therefore, neither 
country was studied in this analysis.  Qatar hosts several U.S. forces and is a staunch ally.  
Unlike the other Gulf countries, however, Qatar maintains official ties with Israel, which 
makes it an anomaly amongst its GCC neighbors.  For this reason, it is not included in 
this analysis, either, although the U.S.-Qatar partnership certainly merits study in another 
forum.   
I interviewed the director of International Studies from the Gulf Research Centre 
(GRC), a Dubai-based organization dedicated to researching strategic issues affecting the 
Gulf region, to determine how the GCC Secretariat General views security cooperation 
with the United States.  This perspective takes into account the threat perceptions of the 
GCC as a whole.  I also interviewed other academics and policy makers from GCC 
member states to elicit information regarding the concerns of both governments and 
people of the individual member states.  Primary source research includes these 
interviews, the interviews with Central Command and Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency staff, and conference material related to EU-GCC security.  Other national 
security strategy documents, Congressional Research Reports, organization posture 
statements, academic journals, and literature comprise my secondary source material.   
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I’s functions are twofold.  Primarily, this chapter explains the importance 
of the following research.  Secondly, the chapter provides the methodology and roadmap 
used to arrive at the conclusions of this research. 
Chapter II’s function provides a recent background of the U.S.-Saudi Arabia 
relationship and explains what factors caused U.S. military forces to withdraw from 
Saudi Arabia during the prelude to the Iraq War in 2003.  This section explores the 
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strategic interests that caused the United States to create a presence in Saudi Arabia and 
examines how the domestic concerns of Saudi Arabia’s society, ulama (senior clergy), 
and royal family eventually forced the United States to withdraw from Saudi Arabia in 
2003. 
Chapter III studies the factors that have allowed the United States to enjoy a 
successful partnership with Bahrain for a period.  This section also explores the strategic 
interests that caused the United States to create bases in Bahrain and the domestic 
concerns that could affect U.S. presence in Bahrain in the future.   
Chapter IV considers the prospect of creating a more robust presence in Oman.  
This chapter takes into consideration the factors that caused the withdrawal from Saudi 
Arabia, the factors that have allowed the United States to enjoy comparatively successful 
relations with Bahrain, and places those factors in context of a potentially more 
substantial U.S. military presence in Oman.  This chapter first looks at the rationale for 
creating a U.S. base in Oman and then looks at the domestic considerations that may 
prevent or facilitate this sort of initiative.   
Chapter V explores the rationale for supporting and pursuing a comprehensive 
GCC security architecture, looks at the collective domestic concerns of the GCC and 
finally, examines the future prospects of a U.S. footprint in the GCC while considering 
what a long-term U.S.-GCC security arrangement would look like.  
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II. SAUDI ARABIA CASE STUDY 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations have recently experienced an unprecedented level of 
deterioration that culminated with the U.S. military withdrawal from Saudi Arabia in 
2003.  This unexpected breakdown in relations raises the question, “Why did Saudi 
Arabia ask the United States to withdraw its military forces from the Kingdom in 2003?”  
The policy debate over the nature of the Saudi Arabian-United States alliance is the 
driving force behind this question.  Arguments for characterizing Saudi Arabia in terms 
of its relationship with the United States range from ally to adversary.  This section draws 
upon academic journals, books, newspapers, government reports, and elite interviews 
with Saudi academics and country experts working in the region.  The Saudi Arabia case 
study is the first country case study of three Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
examined in a cross-country case study among critical GCC countries.   
The argument presented here does not disprove the debates surrounding this issue, 
as they each have their own merits; rather, it illuminates some of the less transparent 
issues underlying those debates.  In doing so, this chapter asserts the following:  Saudi 
Arabia’s centrally located power apparatus, coupled with the burdens of governing a 
rentier state, and the influence of Islamic fundamentalism over politics, makes the Saudi 
monarchy’s foreign policy decisions as they pertain to the United States overly 
susceptible to the pressures of its tribalistic civil society and religious establishment.  
Within the broader analytical framework presented in this research, this section 
demonstrates how increased political and religious pressure from within Saudi Arabia 
forced the Saudi monarchy to request the U.S. withdrawal of most of its military forces 
from Saudi Arabia prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  The importance of focusing on 
Saudi Arabia as one case among many others that deserve equal attention is because the 
U.S. military pullout from Saudi Arabia prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 represents a 
fundamental breakdown in bilateral relations with a critical strategic ally that the United 
States can ill afford to repeat.  This section explores this question by looking at the 
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original rationale for a U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia, the internal domestic pressures in 
Saudi Arabia, and entertains some of the implications of the potential for a repeat 
withdrawal from Bahrain in the future. 
B. BACKGROUND ON U.S.-SAUDI ARABIA RELATIONSHIP 
U.S.-Saudi relations stemmed from a rich economic relationship based on oil.  
Facing the prospects of depleting reserves in the United States after World War I and 
competition from Britain and France, American oil companies set out to secure oil rights 
in the Middle East.  With government support, companies like Standard Oil of New 
Jersey (currently Exxon), Standard Oil of New York (now Mobil), and Atlantic Oil 
Company (now part of Atlantic-Richfield, or ARCO) entered a joint venture called the 
Near East Development Corporation.2  The venture allowed American oil companies to 
operate in Middle East territories, influenced by Britain and France, without prejudice or 
discrimination.3   
By 1933, the Standard Oil Company of California (Socal), a nonsignatory to the 
Red Line Agreement, had obtained a Saudi oil concession from King Abd al-Aziz.4  
Facing economic problems due to a global oil glut prompted by the Great Depression and 
a decline in pilgrimages to Mecca, Saudi Arabia saw few other choices to remedy its 
financial woes.  Ironically, the Saudi view at the time was that American capitalists were 
less harmful than European countries seeking to exert political influence or colonialist 
pressure.5  The California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc), a subsidiary of Socal, 
struck oil in Dammam, Saudi Arabia in 1938.  In 1939, Casoc’s oil production capacity in 
Saudi Arabia had reached 477,000 barrels of oil per day, a number equaling 35% of 
Middle East oil production and 5% of world production.6  The significance of the oil 
                                                 
2 David E. Long, Ambivalent Allies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 11. 
3 Ibid. 
4 The Red Line Agreement limited oil exploration activities in the Middle East.  Combined with the As 
Is Agreement, they determined how international oil transactions took place until World War II. 
5 Long, Ambivalent Allies, 13. 
6 Rachel Bronson, Thicker Than Oil:  America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 2006), 18. 
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concessions obtained in Saudi Arabia directly influenced the massive American 
economic and industrial effort behind its role in World War II.  From this point on, 
American dependence on Saudi oil only grew in demand.  U.S.-Saudi relations were 
mostly economic through the end of World War II.  The relationship, however, took on a 
political dimension after World War II ended and the threat of communism began. 
After World War II, Saudi Arabia demanded more profit from Casoc, now named 
Aramco.7  In order to meet those demands, the U.S. Department of Treasury and Internal 
Revenue Service took on a greater role in U.S.-Saudi relations and exempted Aramco 
from all its U.S. tax burdens, enabling it to meet the new demands set forth by Saudi 
Arabia.  This move sought to prevent the U.S. concession in Saudi Arabia from transfer 
to a competitor.  Other complex deals set out to preserve the status quo.  Increasingly, the 
oil glut and inability of oil rich countries to capitalize on their own oil resources led 
several countries to collaborate under a common agreement and the Oil Producing 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) was born in 1960.8  By 1967, the Suez Canal and Trans-
Arabian Pipeline closures and the unexpected outcome of the Arab-Israeli War created an 
overnight demand for oil, placing Saudi Arabia in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the 
United States.   
By the 1970s, some of the Gulf countries were earning up to $12.7 million an 
hour in oil exports.9  To complicate matters, the 1973 Arab Israeli War highlighted the 
divergence between the economic interests of the oil companies in contrast to the 
political interests of the U.S. government.  The oil executives urged President Nixon not 
to supply military aid to Israel.  Nixon ignored the request and by October 20, 1973, 
Israel began receiving U.S. military supplies.10  With the weight of OPEC behind it, 
 
 
                                                 
7 Long, Ambivalent Allies, 18. 
8 Ibid., 21. 
9 Steven Emerson, The American House of Saud:  The Secret Petrodollar Connection (New York:  
Franklin Watts, 1985), 45. 
10 Ibid., 39. 
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Saudi Arabia imposed an oil embargo on the United States, a move that signaled just how 
much power Saudi Arabia had gained and equally, how dependent the United States had 
become on Saudi oil. 
Prompted by fears of the earlier energy crises and the potential for petro dollars to 
disrupt world markets to achieve political ends, the United States began to take a 
different approach to Saudi Arabia.  Saudi Arabia now viewed the partnership with the 
United States as an equitable one.  For example, in 1973, Saudi Arabia’s defense budget 
allocated a mere $2.8 billion to military equipment acquisition.  By 1978, the Kingdom 
had spent almost $10.3 billion in arms sales.11  The United States discreetly welcomed 
foreign investment from Saudi Arabia, a lynchpin to maintaining the delicate 
relationship.  Any perception by Saudi Arabia’s domestic population that the United 
States was unduly influencing the Saudi monarchy would have adverse consequences.  
American capitalists, however, were not concerned with cultural sensitivity issues.  They 
saw an unprecedented opportunity to bid defense, services, and investment contracts in 
Saudi Arabia.  Military contractors like Raytheon and Northrop produced missile defense 
and aircraft systems, General Motors manufactured several thousand vehicles, Waste 
Management received millions of dollars to service sanitation contracts, and other 
companies like AT&T and IBM took out loans from Saudi Arabia.12  U.S. and Saudi 
interests became entwined even further.  Meanwhile, the U.S. economy underwent a 
severe recession. 
Exacerbated by a spiraling economy and affinity toward Israel, the American 
public and many in the U.S. government came to view Saudi Arabia as an emerging 
adversary who now wielded a political “oil weapon.”13  Anti-Saudi sentiments resonated 
throughout the United States, while Saudi Arabia began to doubt the U.S. security 
guarantee.  Threat perceptions from both sides heightened rapidly.  Insecurities 
culminated at one point, when the United States did nothing to prevent the collapse of the 
                                                 
11 Emerson, The American House of Saud:  The Secret Petrodollar Connection, 55. 
12 Ibid. 
13 David Long, “US-Saudi Relations:  Evolution, Current Conditions, and Future Prospects,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly Summer (2004): 30. 
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American backed shah’s regime in Iran. “Saudis feared that it (the United States) would 
act the same way if the Saudi regime faced similar circumstances.”14  The turning point 
in bilateral relations came in August 1990, when Iraq launched an unprovoked attack 
against Kuwait.  Several areas of consideration emerged from this incursion.  Saudi 
Arabia’s historic, religious, and cultural ties to Kuwait had formed a bond between the 
two countries.  The larger and more powerful Saudi Arabia, however, lacked the 
defensive capability to repel Iraq’s military forces.  Both countries were militarily 
inferior with respect to Iraq’s massive army of 1.2 million.15  Moreover, Kuwait’s status 
as a GCC member had political implications for the other member states.  If Iraq could 
exert its hegemonic ambitions over one GCC state, then the perception was that it could 
do the same against Saudi Arabia or the other smaller GCC states.  Confronted by a 
conventional threat, the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia could be justified to the clerics and 
ulama, although this justification faced more skepticism among Saudi citizens. 
U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm necessitated a cultural 
sensitivity and respect that the Saudi religious ulema demanded.  The U.S. military, 
however, failed to understand the importance of the cultural nuances and underscored its 
actions with several negatively perceived gaffes.  The Saudi perception was that U.S. 
troops had desecrated Saudi holy lands.  American women driving automobiles, service 
members seen urinating in public, and shirts displaying U.S. tanks in the Saudi Arabian 
desert gave the religious establishment grounds for protest.  As liberators of the Middle 
East, U.S. forces felt entitled to certain amenities like alcohol, dancing, and other forms 
of entertainment while deployed to the region.  These Western secular indulgences, 
however, violated several aspects of Islam and fueled the Islamic fundamentalists with 
even more hatred for the West.  As the perception of a security threat waned in Saudi 
Arabia, so did tolerance of U.S. military presence.  The U.S. military now found itself 
caught between pro-Western Saudi reformers seeking more liberalization and the Islamic 
opposition who saw the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia as occupiers.  The opposition 
                                                 
14 Long, Ambivalent Allies, 59. 
15 Thomas Lippman, Inside the Mirage:  America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 2004), 300. 
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consisted of educated men of religion, like Osama Bin Laden.16  They urged the state to 
allow the religious establishment to oversee the government, and the polity began to 
listen. 
Over the next decade, opposition to U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia took on 
violent forms worldwide.  In November 1995, terrorists attacked a joint U.S.-Saudi 
facility causing the loss of five American lives.17  The next year, other terrorists bombed 
Khobar Towers, home to 2,000 U.S. military forces.  Nineteen Americans died and 372 
others suffered serious injuries.18  Iraq’s questionable motives, increasing American 
troop levels in Saudi Arabia, and the increasing distrust of the monarchy from the 
religious opposition continued to threaten stability within the Saudi regime.  Kenneth M. 
Pollack, President Bill Clinton’s director for Gulf affairs at the National Security Council, 
remembered that, “by any measure, the Saudis had become less supportive of limited 
U.S. military operations against Iraq.”19  Just as the war-torn state of Afghanistan became 
a greater source of tension, al-Qaeda launched simultaneous attacks on U.S. embassies in 
Tanzania and Kenya.  The United States responded unilaterally by launching missile 
attacks on Bin Laden’s camps in Afghanistan without informing Saudi Arabia or 
Pakistan.  The attacks and rising regional instability pointed to further diminishing U.S.-
Saudi relations.   
Since the September 11 attacks and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq, tensions 
have only increased between the United States and Saudi Arabia.  U.S. critics allege that 
the Saudi government sponsored the attacks through indirect means or intentional 
negligence, while other critics believe that state acceptance of a fundamentalist attitude 
toward religion is a source of terrorist activity.  Still, other criticisms leveled at Saudi 
Arabia aim at the funding of religious charities and Islamic programs that promote 
                                                 
16 Bronson, Thicker than Oil, 212. 
17 Ibid., 214. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm:  the Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random 
House Inc., 2002), 188.  
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violence.20  The overwhelming Saudi nationality of most 9/11 hijackers and Osama Bin 
Laden’s affiliation to Saudi Arabia has only fueled the criticism.21  Saudi officials have 
diverted some criticism through enhanced counterterrorism cooperation, intelligence 
sharing, and trade cooperation with the United States.  Despite these efforts, however, the 
Saudi regime still faces mounting pressure from its conservative clerical establishment 
that espouses fundamental Wahhabism and the “puritanical beliefs of some Saudi 
citizens.”22  Regardless of increasing domestic tensions, Saudi Arabia’s vast oil reserves 
and geo-strategic importance provide a defined rationale for U.S. presence that 
supersedes many of the other perennial daunting issues. 
C. RATIONALE FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE  
The rationale for stationing U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia is fraught with 
controversy.  Policy and academic debates surrounding the status of the U.S.-Saudi 
Arabia relationship, however, provide insight into how different supporters and critics 
view the partnership.  One argument from skeptics is that the United States and Saudi 
Arabia are such fundamentally different societies that no meaningful and sustainable 
relationship between the two countries can ever be achieved.23  Advocates of this 
position believe that in the wake of 9/11, Saudi Arabia has become, “a problematic ally in 
combating extremism.”24  David E. Long contends that the United States and Saudi 
Arabia have never really understood each other on a cultural or religious level.25  Insofar 
as the bilateral relationship has endured through 2001, it was largely for mutually 
economic reasons with some security exceptions such as expelling Iraq from Kuwait.  
While the mainstream skeptics have not abandoned the prospect of continuing to endure 
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the troubled relationship, they have pursued politically driven prohibitive measures on 
foreign assistance to Saudi Arabia such as international military education, anti-terrorism 
assistance, and counter-terrorism financing assistance.  Some critics have gone so far as 
to suggest that the relationship “should be restructured to reflect what is described as 
fundamentally adversarial relationship.”26   
On the other hand, proponents of the U.S.-Saudi relationship are eager to point 
out that the burden of fighting terrorism is a shared one between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia.  Terrorist attacks against the Saudi regime after the U.S. withdrawal have 
revitalized the need for close cooperation with the United States.  Supporters also refer to 
the consequences of “deconstructing the U.S. Saudi partnership,” citing adverse regional 
implications for the broader Gulf region, oil and defense trade, and the Arab-Israeli 
issue.27  Those issues notwithstanding, a major disruption to the U.S.-Saudi relationship 
would negate the Saudi military’s effectiveness, which would leave a major remaining 
Sunni counterbalance to a predominantly Shia Iran useless—a particularly undesirable 
prospect for the United States. 
Debates aside, three main factors underpin the need for U.S. military troops in 
Saudi Arabia.  Preserving the global oil flow from the Gulf, fostering strategic access to 
fight the Global War on Terrorism, and the more ambiguous goals of promoting regional 
stability and spreading democracy, are interrelated to some extent and promote U.S. 
national interests and foreign policies.  In the past, the lack of a collective security 
framework in the GCC made U.S. access to Saudi Arabia’s bases more feasible.  The 
Saudi monarchy quelled opposition groups by propagating fear of powerful neighbors 
and selling the external U.S. security guarantee as a necessary component of domestic 
security. Missions like Desert Shield and Desert Watch helped achieve an added degree 
of regional stability when the U.S. footprint in Saudi Arabia was much greater.  During 
this period, U.S.-Saudi political, economic, and security interests were more closely 
aligned.  Since the U.S. criticisms of Saudi Arabia after 9/11, the Saudi criticisms of the 
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U.S. invasion of Iraq, and Saudi Arabia’s expanded alliances in Europe and Asia, the two 
countries have less in common politically and economically.  Nonetheless, the ability to 
maintain oil exports at stable levels, fight terrorism, and promote democracy rank as high 
priorities for the United States. 
The strong U.S. demand and increasing prices for Saudi oil continue to support 
the rationale for U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia.  From 1991–2003, with the 
exception of some variations due to Gulf War outliers, Saudi oil exports to the United 
States were relatively stable at reasonable prices.  Under a gentlemen’s agreement 
reached in 2000, OPEC members agreed to increase oil production in order to keep oil 
prices between a $22 and $28 price band.28  Coincidentally, the U.S. military had a 
substantial military force occupying Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia at this time.  
From 2003, the year most military forces left Saudi Arabia, until 2006, oil exports from 
Saudi Arabia to the United States steadily decreased from 1.774 millions of barrels per 
day (MBD) in 2003 to 1.461 MBD in 2006.29  Moreover, oil prices rose substantially to 
around $77 per barrel by July 2007.  By holding approximately 1.3 to 1.4 MBD in 
reserve production capacity, Saudi Arabia has effectively contributed to higher oil prices.  
The U.S. security guarantee and presence in Saudi Arabia during the 1990s clearly 
affected the volume and price of oil imported by the United States.  By contrast, lower 
imports and higher oil prices between the United States and Saudi Arabia are the norm in 
recent years.  David Long notes that while the global market and to some extent, OPEC, 
control the price of oil, short-term price spikes are avoided by enhanced cooperation 
between the two partners.  How that cooperation occurs, however, is another matter. 
A robust counterterrorism partnership and deterrent capability that includes access 
to Saudi territory represents another vital aspect to U.S. foreign policy that supports the 
rationale for U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.  Initiatives like this are clearly outlined in most 
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U.S. national and defense strategies.30  More importantly, both the United States and 
Saudi Arabia have finally agreed that international terrorism is one of the greatest threats 
faced by both countries.  Likewise, Iran and Israel still pose a major concern to Saudi 
Arabia’s national interest and could require the deployment of more U.S. troops to assist 
in Saudi Arabia’s defense.  Saudi Arabia’s fundamental weakness as a defensive power 
threatens its very existence as a nation.  Without the United States providing security, 
Saudi Arabia is vulnerable to attack from its enemies.  These threats, when considered 
grave enough by the Saudi regime, justify U.S. troops in the country.  
Other aspects of having U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia are beneficial to the United 
States, especially in the post-9/11 environment.  The most obvious is Saudi Arabia’s 
strategic location.  The Kingdom’s proximity to several U.S. adversaries makes its 
location invaluable for launching U.S. military operations from within the region.31  
Operation Hard Surface was the deployment in the 1960s to Saudi Arabia of eight F-
100D tactical fighters to deter Egypt from entering Saudi airspace.32  More recent 
operations like Vigilant Warrior, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom, and 
Iraqi Freedom all required critical access to Saudi territory and airspace.  Between 1992 
and 2000, U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia increased steadily from approximately 2,000 
troops in 1992 all the way to 7,500 troops in 2000.  U.S. access to pre-positioned military 
equipment, infrastructure like Prince Sultan Airbase, and the ability to operate a 
command and control node, like the U.S. Air Force Combined Air Operation Center were 
also critical to deterring common enemies, and staging the fight against global terrorism 
in Afghanistan.  
Perhaps the more lofty goals of promoting democracy and regional stability also 
warrant U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia.  Now, however, these ambitions may be best 
accomplished through less intrusive security cooperation and various forms of “soft 
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power.”  The Bush administration approved a plan in 2007 to provide billions of dollars 
in advanced weapons systems to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel over the next 10 years.33  
Some critics allege that the Bush administration tried to buy its way back into Saudi 
Arabia.  Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice indicated that, “no quid pro quo was 
involved in the arms sale.”  Rather, the consensus is that the arms sale provided a hedge 
against the growing influence of Iran.  Nevertheless, the arms deal could pave the trail for 
a U.S. troop deployment to Saudi Arabia should Iran commit an act of aggression toward 
the Kingdom.  Saudi Arabia’s domestic concerns, however, make this prospect 
questionable at best. 
D. SAUDI ARABIA’S DOMESTIC CONCERNS 
In October 2001, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia read a message to U.S. 
President Bush.  He stated the following: 
We are at a crossroads.  It is time for the United States and Saudi Arabia 
to look at their separate interests.  Those governments that don’t feel the 
pulse of the people and respond to it will suffer the fate of the Shah of 
Iran.34 
Two years later, the majority of U.S. troops left Saudi Arabia.35  The crown 
prince’s statement reflects the dilemma that both the United States and Saudi Arabia face 
in the current political environment.  In other words, the Saudi regime’s foreign policy 
decisions are ultimately subject to the will of the Saudi people and religious 
establishment.  The burdens of governing a rentier state only complicate this burden. As a 
result, the United States is indirectly affected by the degree to which the Saudi opposition 
and clerical establishment causes the Saudi regime to alter its foreign policy.  Three main 
factors account for the Saudi regime’s susceptibility to this influence:  the centrally 
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powered nature of the regime, the burdens of governing a rentier state, and the role of 
Wahhabism, a fundamental version of Sunni Islam, plays in the polity.  Other issues, such 
as negative opinions toward U.S. foreign policies and the Arab-Israeli conflict, affect 
Saudi foreign policy more profoundly because of these factors. 
The very structure of Saudi Arabia’s centrally powered monarchical regime 
makes it susceptible to political manipulation from within.  The late Saudi King Faisal 
represented the quintessential monarch of Saudi Arabia as, “King, Imam, and Servant of 
the Holy Cities.”36  He demonstrated that one man could consolidate several elements of 
governance, administration, and religion under one ruler.  More importantly, he identified 
and acknowledged the relationship between the Saudi centrally powered regime and the 
people over which the regime ruled.   
The important thing about a regime is not what it is called but how it acts.  
There are corrupt republican regimes and sound monarchies and vice 
versa.  The only true criterion of a regime—whether it be monarchial or 
republican—is the degree of reciprocity between the ruler and ruled and 
the extent to which it symbolizes prosperity, progress, and healthy 
initiative.37 
This high degree of reciprocity between the Saudi regime and its people, 
highlighted during the prelude to the Iraq invasion by the United States, inevitably 
contributed to the decision to ask the U.S. to withdraw most of its troops from Saudi 
Arabia.  Publicly, this move by the Saudi regime assuaged the demands of the Saudi 
people and its religious establishment while allowing the Saudi leaders to accept credit 
for the U.S. withdrawal.  Privately, however, the Saudis still supported the United States 
by granting access to military facilities, providing intelligence, special operations staging 
areas, and logistical support for preparation to invade Iraq.38  Dr. Saleh Al Mani writes 
the following of the GCC governments.  “They opposed the war on Iraq and any 
perception of an alliance with the war’s proprietors was looked at in the most negative 
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manner.  Thus, the Gulf States had to criticize the Bush administration policies in Iraq 
and Palestine, while at the same time seeking to be on good terms with it.”39  Balancing 
the domestic security requirements with society pressures has been a difficult undertaking 
for the Saudis, and the lack of political liberalization puts the regime at risk during the 
implementation of unpopular foreign policies.  In sum, because of the regime’s 
accountability to and interdependence with its people, Saudi foreign policy as it pertains 
to the United States will always be subject to some degree of manipulation.  Arguably, 
this is a valuable concession that allows the royal family to exert influence in other areas.  
The burdens of governing an oil rentier state also create a similar effect over Saudi 
foreign policy, albeit to a lesser degree. 
After the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the oil boom and subsequent petro dollar 
revolution altered Saudi Arabia and its economy drastically.40  Simultaneously, Saudi 
Arabia became a rentier and generous welfare state under the leadership of King Faisal.  
A patron-client system between the regime and people provided the regime with more 
autonomy during the oil boom.  For example, Saudi Arabia’s civil society accepted free 
education and social services at no cost while the state subsidized basic consumer goods.  
The state also subsidized basic utilities and public transportation at a substantial discount.  
Domestic entrepreneurs received low-cost loans while the Kingdom invited direct foreign 
investment from the West.41  Several problems, however, unfolded after this rapid 
accumulation of wealth and power.   
Under the newfound economic prosperity, Saudi society tolerated the lack of 
political liberalization because the regime provided generous economic assistance to the 
Saudi people.  On the other hand, ultra-conservative religious groups viewed the royal 
family and its excessive spending as materialistic and un-Islamic.  The new wealth meant 
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that as long as regime addressed the basic requirements for subsistence and economic 
welfare, the Saudi people would remain untaxed and in return, make few political 
demands of the regime.  During the 1980s, however, the rentier state became a burden to 
Saudi Arabia during an economic recession.  After a decade of inflated oil prices, 
consumers began to conserve on oil products while oil companies looked to Alaska and 
the North Sea for less costly oil.42  Saudi Arabia’s economy slowly slipped into 
recession.  Instead of reinvesting their income in the Saudi economy, foreign workers 
remitted the money back to their families.  Faced with a growing budget deficit, Saudi 
Arabia erased subsidies and increased taxes.  With these cuts, though, the regime suffered 
increasing political pressure and waning support.  The rapidly growing Saudi population, 
high unemployment rates, and lack of domestic workers increased the burdens of 
sustaining a welfare state while diminishing Saudi Arabia’s ability to pursue investment 
elsewhere.  Moreover, the Saudi regime realized that the concessions granted under the 
provisions of a rentier state would become unsustainable over the long term and during 
periods of recession like those of the 1980s.  Today, the regime understands that if it 
cannot meet the economic demands of people under the current constraints of the rentier 
state, especially with the increasing unpopularity of Saudi pro-Western accommodations, 
the regime becomes more susceptible to political pressure and manipulation.  Likewise, 
the ultra-conservative clerical establishment creates equal pressure on the regime since 
they view many of the government’s fiscal policies as un-Islamic.  The next section 
entertains this phenomenon. 
Saudi Islamic fundamentalists are perhaps the most potent force encouraging 
manipulation of the regime’s foreign policy decisions pertaining to the United States.  In 
particular, the disenfranchisement of radical Wahhabists (derived from the teachings of 
Ibn Abdul Wahhab, a reformer of the early eighteenth century who called for “a return to 
the puritanical forms of Islam”) causes great concern for the regime.43  During the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, and later—to counter Iranian influence there—Saudi Arabia 
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employed religious Sunni radicals against Soviet communism and the Shia influence 
from Iran.  The unintended consequences of these proxy fights was development and the 
return of battle-hardened, fundamental religious jihadists seeking a literalist interpretation 
of the Quran and the fundamental practice and teaching of Islam in Saudi society.  
Influenced by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and men like Seyyed Qutb 
and Hassan al-Banna, the Saudi fundamentalists hardly approved of the Saudi 
government’s accommodations for the West, much less the materialistic, free-spending 
habits of the Saudi royal family.   
The opposition’s disenfranchisement with the royal family and the regime is 
entrenched in Saudi history.  For instance, the split between the royal family and the 
religious opposition dates back to Ibn Saud’s declaration of himself as king of Saudi 
Arabia and his subsequent pact with the British.  By violating the laws of Islam, he also 
became an enemy of the Ikhwan, a group intent on expanding the Islamic state.44  The 
regime has faced other instances of opposition.  In 1979, Juhaiman al-Utaibi and his 
rebels briefly captured Grand Mosque in Mecca.  During a three-week fight, the 
government regained control of the Grand Mosque as the rebels succumbed.  Around the 
same period, Shias in the Eastern Province, fueled by the Shah’s overthrow in Iran, rioted 
against the regime until quelled by the National Guard.45  Fortunately, the Saudi royal 
family is synonymous with the aptly named country, a luxury that allows the royal family 
to maintain its stronghold on power and keep the state in a relatively stable condition.  
The Saudi regime, however, is not exempt from making some concessions to its 
opposition.  After the bombings in Riyadh and Khobar, for example, no mass arrests or 
executions of Islamists took place.46  After the Gulf War, the Saudi government, under 
pressure to reform, inaugurated a consultative group appointed by the king.  The king 
also codified religious laws for secular purposes in order to appease Islamists.  Affecting 
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the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia in 2003 earned the Saudi regime 
significant credibility with its critics and opposition while costing it very little in terms of 
an external security guarantee.   
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter concludes that a lengthy U.S.-Saudi history based upon 
mutual economic and security reasons and a clearly defined rationale still warrant a 
larger, but carefully measured, U.S. footprint in Saudi Arabia based on the demand for oil 
and the global terrorism challenges faced today.  These U.S. economic and foreign policy 
goals, however, still meet resistance from the centrally powered nature of the Saudi 
regime, the burdens of governing an oil rentier state, and the religious opposition’s effect 
on the Saudi royal family.  Additionally, U.S. foreign policies and the U.S. support for 
Israel continue to create fissures between the United States and Saudi Arabia.  Ill feelings 
stemming from 9/11 still resonate between both countries.  While it seems unlikely that 
U.S.-Saudi relations will experience a complete breakdown, given the recent arms 
negotiation and other modest forms cooperation, it is unknown whether mutual interests 
in “oil, regional security, and in combating global terrorism” can override Saudi Arabia’s 
susceptibility to foreign policy manipulation from within.47  The next chapter looks at the 
U.S. relationship with Bahrain to determine what lessons can be applied from the Saudi 
Arabia case and vice versa. 
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III. BAHRAIN CASE STUDY 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the evolution of the U.S.-Bahrain bilateral relationship 
during the past 60 years.  The purpose of this chapter is to discover why the United States 
has enjoyed a comparatively more amenable relationship with Bahrain than it has with 
Saudi Arabia.  This question not only has profound implications for the U.S. relationship 
with Bahrain, but also has implications on U.S. relations in the greater Middle East.  
Arguments pertaining to the U.S. relationship with Bahrain are generally in favor of 
maintaining the status quo while continuing to assist Bahrain with the modernization of 
its defense force.  Bahrain’s lack of political reform in the past has drawn criticism, but 
recent reforms have shadowed its shortcomings of the past.  This section draws upon 
academic journals, books, newspapers, government reports, and elite interviews with 
experts on Bahrain’s affairs.  The Bahrain case study is the second case study of three 
countries examined in a cross-country case study among critical Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. 
This chapter argues that Bahrain’s implementation of political reform resulting in 
democratic elections and a National Assembly, its economic diversification away from 
oil, and its handling of religious opposition, makes the regime less susceptible to foreign 
policy manipulation from its religious establishment and civil society.  The reforms, 
therefore, makes the U.S. relationship with Bahrain more optimal that its relationship 
with Saudi Arabia.  Within the broader analytical framework presented in this research, 
this chapter demonstrates these factors have paved the way for more significant 
cooperation between the United States and Bahrain.  The importance of focusing on the 
U.S.-Bahrain relationship is because of the overall success it has produced between the 
United States and a major GCC ally, the minimal opposition it has endured, and its 
potential for replication elsewhere in the region.  This section explores these phenomena 
by providing a brief overview of the origins of the relationship, outlines reasons why the 
U.S. pursued a substantive military presence in Bahrain, and discusses what domestic 
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considerations arose from the U.S. presence in Bahrain.  Finally, the chapter analyzes 
what factors made the U.S.-Bahrain relationship comparatively more successful than the 
U.S.-Saudi Arabia relationship.  
B. BACKGROUND ON U.S.-BAHRAIN RELATIONSHIP 
While U.S.-Saudi relations have experienced a steady decline in recent years, the 
United States has enjoyed a comparatively benevolent relationship with Bahrain.  The 
origins of U.S.-Bahrain relations are grounded in mutual security interests and have 
expanded to economic issues and political reform more recently.48  As a smaller state 
among more powerful neighbors, Bahrain has typically aligned its security interests with 
the United States.  For over 60 years, Bahrain has hosted U.S. naval command forces 
such as the U.S. Middle East Force, NAVCENT, and the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet.  The 
Naval Headquarters component conducts a variety of naval anti-terrorism, counter-
narcotics, and oil-platform protection missions within the Arabian Sea.  Bahrain currently 
houses over 3,000 U.S. military personnel. 
Bahrain’s formal origins with the United States began in 1949, when the United 
States leased office space at a British compound in Jufair.  This concession set a 
precedent for future endeavors, but substantive relations did not occur until between 1970 
and 1971, when the British left Bahrain and when Iran recognized Bahrain’s 
independence as a state.49  While Bahrain welcomed the acknowledgement of its 
independence from Iran, its suspicions of Iran’s underlying motives led it to seek security 
with the United States.  By the end of 1971, the United States had signed a lease granting 
Bahrain access to communications systems, naval repair facilities, aircraft hangars, and 
landing rights in Jufair and Muharraq Airfield.50  By the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Bahrain 
had terminated the lease because of U.S. support for Israel and the unpopular foreign 
policies of the West.  At this point, the U.S. reduced its footprint in Bahrain, which made 
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the U.S.-Bahrain arrangement more informal.  The United States re-titled its units as 
“temporary” and “administrative” and only allowed the U.S. Navy Middle East Force 
admiral to live in Bahrain.51  Practically speaking, it had little effect on the U.S. mission 
there, but publicly, the moves quelled domestic opposition. 
By 1974, relations began to normalize.  Bahrain saw the United States as a Middle 
East stabilizer despite pleas from Egypt, Syria, and Libya to revoke docking privileges.  
In 1977, the original agreement expired and a new arrangement was brokered in order to 
maintain a more regular, but lower profile naval presence in Jufair.  The lower U.S. 
profile was evident in Bahrain’s relatively stable political climate.  In 1979, however, 
remarks by then U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sparked short-lived outrage 
among Manama locals after he hinted at increasing U.S. presence in the Gulf.52  During 
the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the U.S. footprint in the Gulf increased substantially.  
U.S. Navy destroyers deterred Iranian advances toward Basra, Iraq and more broadly, 
sought to minimize Soviet influence in the region.   
Bahrain quickly epitomized the ideal GCC ally for the United States as the 
Navy’s Middle East Force began re-flagging Kuwaiti oil tankers traveling through the 
Strait of Hormuz with the U.S. flag during Operation Earnest Will.  The increased 
presence and expanding U.S. influence in the Gulf also coincided with a campaign to 
modernize the facilities and military of Bahrain.  Several U.S. arms transfers to Bahrain 
occurred over the next decades.  Bahrain initially received several F-5 fighter jets, M-60 
tanks, F-16 fighter jets, artillery shells, and other military hardware in the 1980s.53  
Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to, “equip, support, and train the regime’s armed forces,” helped 
cement strategic relations between the two allies. 
Since the early 1990s, Bahrain has played a pivotal role in both the U.S.-led 
campaigns against Iraq and the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan.  During 
Desert Storm, Bahrain hosted more than 17,500 U.S. troops and their combat aircraft at 
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Shaykh Isa Air Base.54  Additionally, Bahraini pilots assisted the United States by flying 
combat missions over Iraq during the conflict as well.  As a result, the United States 
signed a 10-year defensive cooperation pact that both parties renewed in 2001.55  Bahrain 
gave support to the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom against 
Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom two years later in Iraq.  Bahrain allowed 
between 4,000 to 4,500 troops to launch operations from its bases while lending supplies, 
pre-positioned equipment, facilities, and airspace for these operations.  In recognition of 
Bahrain’s military efforts and assistance during these campaigns, the United States sold 
Bahrain more F-5 and F-16C fighter jets, Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missiles 
(AMRAAM), STINGER anti-aircraft missiles, and Army Tactical Missile Systems 
(ATACMS).56   
Table 1 shows the amount of foreign military funding (FMF) and international 
military and education training funds (IMET) the United States has granted Bahrain since 
2002. 
 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 
FMF(in millions) $28.5 $90 $24.6 $18.85 $19 
IMET(in thousands) $395 $448 $600 $650 $650 
Table 1.   U.S. Assistance to Bahrain57 
Bahrain’s stability, accommodation for U.S. forces, and recent political reforms 
makes it a key strategic interest for the United States.  Moreover, the recent signing of a 
Free Trade Agreement between Bahrain and the United States has added an important 
economic element to the strategic partnership.  As such, the rationale for U.S. presence in 
the emirate is more compelling now than ever. 
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C. RATIONALE FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE  
The rationale for maintaining U.S. military forces in Bahrain is clearly the 
strongest among the three GCC countries studied in this research.  While significantly 
less controversial than the U.S.-Saudi relationship, the U.S.-Bahrain relationship still 
receives some criticism, mainly for its civil rights shortcomings of the 1990s.  The United 
States has largely overlooked those failures since Bahrain has improved its human rights 
record and undergone more substantive political reform in recent years.  These issues 
notwithstanding, three factors primarily warrant the only permanent U.S. presence in the 
Gulf.  First, like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain’s centrality in the Middle East makes it 
strategically invaluable for U.S. military operations in the Gulf.  America’s ability to 
permanently station naval forces and conduct maritime operations in Bahrain is a critical 
aspect of the U.S. military mission in the Gulf.  Secondly, Bahrain has recently engaged 
in more meaningful political reforms and some democratic processes.  In an effort to 
promote democracy and stability in the Middle East, U.S. policymakers recognize that 
Bahrain’s progress in limited political liberalization may produce similar outcomes in 
other Middle East countries.  Thirdly, Bahrain’s economic diversification away from oil, 
its promotion of direct foreign investment, and its recent signing of a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with America, all signify that Bahrain is quickly becoming an 
economic force for stability in the region.  
Situated in the heart of the Gulf, Bahrain’s strategic geography has immense 
importance for the United States.  Bahrain’s territory consists mostly of a 620-square-
kilometer main island and several other smaller islands in its surrounding waters.58  
Bahrain is approximately an eight-minute flight to Iran and a thirty-minute flight to Iraq.  
Furthermore, Bahrain sits along the main shipping channels into Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait.59  For the United States, “working with Bahrain to maintain regional peace and 
security in the face of Iran’s threat is a critical foreign policy goal.”60   
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Accomplishing this goal requires several elements of cooperation between the two 
allies.  Funding to Bahrain typically is allocated for improved defensive and regional 
deterrent capabilities, technological upgrades to existing U.S. weapons systems, 
integration of the air defense network, expanded maritime interdiction operations, and 
greater interoperability with U.S. systems.61  The United States also emphasizes 
improving its human and civil rights record, promoting military professionalism, and 
fostering the relationship between Bahraini and American military officers.  Beyond 
normal foreign nation funding activities, preventing the spread of al-Qaeda terrorists into 
Bahrain, underpins a major component of the U.S. National Security Strategy.  Therefore, 
the funding for and implementation of counterterrorism programs and joint 
counterterrorism activities continues to be a high priority.  
Bahrain’s geographic and internal vulnerabilities and threat perceptions create an 
advantageous situation for the United States.  Because of Bahrain’s unwillingness to 
establish strong relations with neighbors like Qatar and its inability to defend itself 
against its powerful adversaries like Iran, and in the past, Iraq, Bahrain sits in a uniquely 
unenviable position.  Bahrain is clearly susceptible to a naval attack from any direction 
and its proximity to Iran makes it vulnerable to a wide range of missile attacks.  The 
regime has also expressed concern that Iran could exert its influence over the country’s 
large Shia opposition and cause an uprising from within.  Even more concerning, the 
12,000-strong Bahrain Defence Force is barely adequate for repelling any sort of major 
attack.  As a result, Bahrain’s security interests naturally conform to those of the United 
States, its primary external security guarantor.  In return, Bahrain grants generous access 
to infrastructure and the regime provides extensive cooperation in most areas.   
The impetus for housing U.S. forces in Bahrain and naming Bahrain a non-NATO 
major ally to the United States stems in part from the drastic political reforms Bahrain 
has undergone over the last five to six years.  U.S. FMF to Bahrain has decreased 
significantly because of vast improvements in democratic reform.  Indeed, the reduction 
reflects a shift under Hamad’s rule to improved political reform, effective governance, 
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and the emergence of a stronger civil society.62  In November 2000, Hamad sanctioned a 
committee with the purpose of developing a plan for transforming Bahrain from a 
hereditary emirate to a constitutional monarchy.  During a referendum in February 2001, 
the Bahraini public engaged in its first comprehensive democratic process since 1970 by 
voting on a National Action Charter.  The Charter received overwhelming endorsement 
and more reform followed.  Hamad released prisoners from the State Security prison and 
abolished the associated State Security Law and Court.  He then pardoned all political 
prisoners in exile and allowed them to return to Bahrain.  Shortly thereafter, the Shaikh 
pronounced Bahrain a constitutional monarchy and changed his own status from Amir to 
King. 
Some of the most important reforms, however, came in 2002 during the 
implementation of parliamentary elections, the establishment of independent oversight 
groups, and the creation of the Supreme Judicial Council to regulate the complex system 
of courts.  It is important to note that during the 2002 parliamentary elections, four 
predominantly Shia groups boycotted the elections to protest the distribution of powers 
the King afforded both the appointed upper chamber and the elected lower chamber.  
During the 2006 elections, however, all political societies participated in the process. One 
of the largest opposition groups, Al Wifaq, now represents the largest percentage of the 
Council of Representatives.63  Bahrain’s ability to manage its opposition and even 
integrate opposition groups into the mainstream political process marks a distinct 
improvement in the effectiveness of its political system.  Overall, Bahrain’s progress in 
political reform is commendable.  The King is not without his critics, though.  
Throughout the Middle East, deliberalization, or the retraction of previously granted 
political freedoms, seems to be a growing trend.  Some critics believe Bahrain is 
regressing into the realm of a category called “liberalized autocracy,” or a move back 
toward absolutism.64  Practically speaking, however, U.S. access to Bahraini facilities 
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and pre-positioned equipment is strategically important and Bahrain’s democratic reform 
is especially appealing.  Furthermore, the regime’s economic diversification away from 
oil epitomizes America’s policy of combating terrorism with trade.  The next section 
explores this concept. 
On the verge of expiring oil reserves, Bahrain has worked to diversify its 
economy while stabilizing oil production at sustainable rates in the short term.  As part of 
its diversification effort, Bahrain has become a major financial center in the Middle East.  
It houses several international financial institutions and its financial sector contributes the 
highest percentage of its GDP, at around 27.5%.  Furthermore, Bahrain has increased its 
commercial, investment, and leasing banks to become a center with the most 
concentrated financial institutions.65 The financial sector is not the only area where 
Bahrain has improved.  Development plans for the expansion in information technology, 
healthcare, and education are all part of a broader campaign to modernize.  Bahrain is 
also currently expanding the Bahrain International Airport and privatizing the operation 
of its seaports.  In 2006, Bahrain’s bilateral trade exceeded $1 billion for the first time 
and the U.S.-Bahrain FTA, which took effect on August 1, 2006, has generated 
significant success.  The importance of Bahrain’s economic success as it pertains to the 
United States cannot be overstated. 
The 2006, U.S. National Security Strategy outlines a plan to promote economic 
growth and combat terrorism through free markets and trade.  The goal of creating an 
open and free global economy is to “empower individuals” who will in turn demand 
greater political freedom.  As a result, “the United States promotes free and fair trade, 
open markets, a stable financial system, the integration of the global economy, and 
secure, clean energy development.”66 Bahrain has clearly met several of these economic 
goals and exceeded expectations from the U.S. standpoint.  For this reason, an Al-Qaeda 
terrorist attack or an act of aggression from Iran would have catastrophic consequences 
for Bahrain and U.S. interests in the region.  Bahrain’s economic success is a model for 
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other GCC and non-GCC Arab states to emulate.  In fact, the U.S. rationale could not be 
stronger for helping Bahrain sustain its accomplishments thus far and continue on the 
path of modernization, economic growth, and political liberalization.  The notion that 
remains in question, however, is whether the trade programs can be tailored to specific 
countries and their needs.67 
D. BAHRAIN’S DOMESTIC CONCERNS 
The following section delves into the foundations of Bahrain’s most pressing 
domestic concerns.  In August 2000, the U.S. Fifth Fleet aided the Bahraini government 
in the recovery effort of a Manama-bound airplane crash.  While the incident received 
national television coverage, the government-owned station marginalized the rescue 
efforts by the United States in order to minimize the visibility of the U.S. footprint 
there.68  Downplaying the U.S. role in Bahrain has been the lynchpin to eluding 
opposition directed toward the Bahrain regime’s association with the United States while 
addressing U.S. force protection concerns.  Unlike other Gulf countries, Bahrain has 
tolerated to an extent, public protests, and similar demonstrations against the government.  
In May 2004, 5,000 demonstrators under the guidance of the opposition group Al Wifaq 
took to the streets to demonstrate against the U.S. occupation of Iraq.  Police quelled the 
opposition with rubber bullets and tear gas at the behest of the Interior Minister, who 
King Hamad subsequently fired for his harsh response.  In contrast to Saudi Arabia, three 
main factors enable the Bahraini regime to manage its foreign policy as it pertains to the 
United States more effectively than Saudi Arabia: a more liberalized political system, a 
less fundamental religious opposition, and economic diversification away from oil.  Since 
the above-mentioned section primarily outlines this argument and it coincides closely 
with the U.S. rational for presence in Bahrain, the following section will examine the 
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origins of the factors that led to a specific reform and how those reforms collectively 
enable the U.S. to operate successfully in Bahrain.69   
Indeed, Bahrain’s secular opposition is not merely satisfied with the reforms thus 
far, and therefore, it is important to note that many of the same themes that defined 
opposition groups earlier on still resonate in Bahrain’s civil society today.  Overcoming 
this opposition is a constant challenge.  The first significant instance of political dissent 
in Bahrain spanned sectarian lines in the 1950s.  Sunni and Shia sects came together to 
form committees, conduct demonstrations, and strike in order to exact reform in public 
health, education, and prejudicial abuse against Shia by the Sunni dominated police.70  At 
this point, however, the opposition’s identity was largely secular as were the issues they 
sought to address.  Limited reform eventually came in the way of partially elected 
councils and a ten-man Advisory Council consisting of appointees from the princely 
family.71  In local areas, half-appointed and half-elected municipal councils governed the 
populations.  In Shia-dominated areas, however, the administrators of governance all 
received their appointments by the Shaikh.    
Like Saudi Arabia’s political climate today, 1950s Bahrain used archaic 
paternalism, tribalism, and traditionalism as tools for achieving governance and 
conveying superficial reform to the people.  By the end of the 1950s, the Shaikh enacted 
more substantive legislation under threat of violence and riots.72  The reforms, though, 
still did not address many of the meaningful issues that opposition groups, like the 
nationalists, sought to change.  In reaction to the impasse, the Shaikh began a campaign 
of exiling opposition leaders.  Major reforms did not occur until the early 1970s when the 
decree for elections resulted in an elected legislative body of 22 and 19 appointees along 
with a constitution.  What is clear from the analysis during the 1950s and 1960s is that 
sectarian affiliations did not influence the opposition nearly as much as the desire to 
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affect more “universal” reforms like women’s suffrage, improved labor rights, and an 
open political process.  Sunni-Shia tensions, however, came to a head by the 1970s. 
In contrast to Saudi Arabia’s fundamental religious opposition, Bahrain’s Shia 
opposition has endured significant marginalization in the past.  One distinct difference 
between the two countries is that Saudi Arabia’s opposition, the population, and the 
ruling regime are primarily Sunni.  Conversely, Bahrain’s opposition and its population 
are primarily Shia, while the ruling family is primarily Sunni.  The origins of the conflict 
date back to 1783, when the Sunni al-Khalifah family conquered and took over a 
predominantly Shia Bahrain.  Since then, Bahrain’s Shias have been excluded from 
positions of power in the ruling institutions, the BDF, and senior administrative positions 
in the bureaucracy.  In effect, Bahrain’s ruling power disqualified Shias for employment, 
pushed them into poverty, and removed them from the political equation, often through 
indirect means of discrimination.  For instance, after the Amir ordered the formation of a 
National Assembly in 1973, on which Shias served, and it seemed to be gaining too much 
power, he quickly dissolved the assembly within two years.  This prompted the 
development of a widespread, distinctly Shia opposition.73   
The opposition drew its lessons from Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution and 
used religious tools to articulate their voice for change.  They sought to affect reform 
through petitions, protests, religious sermons, and speeches.  Their demands expanded to 
eventually address broader grievances that related specifically to Shias.  By the 1990s, 
“the Shiites emerged as a unified political force.”74  To counter the various forms of 
discrimination imposed on their community, Shias organized the development of matams 
(meeting places) and charity funds to provide welfare for the Shia community.  When 
King Hamad took over after his father died in 1999, he immediately released Shiite 
political prisoners and pardoned several other political dissidents living in exile abroad.  
Perhaps most importantly, King Hamad released Shaikh Abd al-Amier al-Jamri, “the 
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most revered Shiite opposition figure in Bahrain.”75  By co-opting the Shiite opposition 
into mainstream politics and rectifying injustices of the past, King Hamad has met some 
of the opposition’s demands and thereby, mitigated some of the criticism toward foreign 
policy.  In general, the tolerant regime has “welcomed the new religious opposition” to 
engage in a political dialogue, a mutually beneficial move for both sides.76   
The last point that enables Bahrain to conduct foreign policy more effectively 
than Saudi Arabia is the fact that Bahrain is currently in the late stages of a campaign to 
diversify its economy away from oil.  Most estimates suggest that Bahrain’s oil reserves 
will expire in 10–15 years and that its natural gas reserves in 50 years.  Saudi Arabia 
grants Bahrain access to its offshore Abu Safa oilfield, which produces about 150,000 
barrels per day and generously supplements Bahrain’s oil production, but Bahrain’s 
recent signing of the FTA with the United States makes this arrangement vulnerable to 
Saudi pressure.77  The fact that Bahrain is not a welfare state—nor an oil rentier state, for 
that matter—has rendered the state ineffective at quelling opposition groups with 
generous subsidies, loans, and employment.  Instead, the regime has advocated more 
conventional forms of economic advancement, such as improving labor laws and 
increasing economic liberalization.  One cannot argue with the fact the Saudi Arabia’s 
vast oil reserves grants it the premier international and financial status it now enjoys, but 
perhaps the lack of oil in Bahrain is a blessing in disguise.  Bahrain’s advancements in 
improving employment by hiring more Bahrainis for domestic jobs, the promotion of 
tourism, and an increase in investment have boded well for the small GCC country.  The 
notable absence of oil and the rentier effect that follows has ultimately given the regime 
more freedom, in terms of its relationship with the United States, from opposition groups 
seeking reform. 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter concludes that compared to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain is not 
susceptible to the same influences that would cause the regime to alter its foreign policy 
or bilateral relationship with the United States to any significant degree.  Drawing from 
several U.S. national strategy documents, Bahrain meets essentially every criteria set 
forth by the United States for establishing bilateral partnerships, defeating terrorism, 
opening trade, and promoting democracy.  Furthermore, Bahrain has effectively 
addressed all the domestic concerns discussed in this chapter to some extent.  The 
rationale for continued U.S. presence in Bahrain is extremely compelling and the case for 
replicating Bahrain’s success elsewhere in the Gulf is just as strong.  The next chapter 
looks at the U.S. relationship with Oman to determine whether the success the United 
States has achieved with Bahrain can also be achieved with a more robust presence in 
Oman. 
 36
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IV. OMAN CASE STUDY 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Next to Bahrain, Oman arguably represents one of the most sought-after U.S. 
strategic interests within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), yet this country currently 
hosts the fewest U.S. forces of all the GCC countries.78  The purpose of this chapter is to 
entertain the implications of pursuing a larger U.S. footprint in Oman.  Policy makers and 
academics highlight two main arguments that account the decline of U.S. military forces 
from Oman.  The first argument suggests that as Operation Enduring Freedom and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and unfolded, fewer air strikes occurred and the military utility 
of the Omani air bases decreased for the United States; therefore, the reduction was by 
mutual agreement between Oman and the United States.  The second argument identifies 
negative public perception of U.S. foreign policies among Omanis as a decisive factor in 
the force reduction.  This chapter draws upon academic journals, books, newspapers, 
government reports, and elite interviews with experts on Oman’s affairs.  The Oman case 
study is the third case study among three critical GCC countries examined in this 
research. 
This chapter argues that Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Busaid’s personal leadership, 
advocacy of reform, pursuit of economic diversification, and promotion of tolerance has 
allowed the Sultanate of Oman to emerge as an independent foreign policy. Within the 
broader analytical framework presented in this research, this chapter concludes that with 
careful analysis, a larger U.S. footprint in Oman is a feasible U.S. foreign policy goal.  
The importance of focusing on the U.S.-Oman relationship is because of Oman’s 
moderate government, its strategic geography, the expanding economy, and its ability to 
host U.S. military forces with minimal opposition.  The threat of Iran also makes Oman 
an important strategic ally.  This chapter explores these characteristics by providing an 
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overview of the origins of the relationship, the U.S. rationale for a larger footprint in 
Oman, and the domestic considerations that may adversely affect the potential for a U.S. 
presence there. 
B. BACKGROUND OF U.S.-OMAN RELATIONSHIP 
The U.S.-Oman relationship began in the late 1700s, when American trade 
merchants used to port in Muscat on trade routes to the East Indies.  By 1833, the United 
States and Oman had agreed on the first U.S. bilateral agreement with an Arab state.  The 
treaty was called the “Treaty of Amity and Commerce” and shortly led to the opening of 
the first American consul in Muscat.  Over the next few decades, missionaries and 
medical personnel began to arrive in Oman.  Despite the increased U.S. involvement in 
Oman, trade relations declined due to increasing competition from India and Britain in 
the date trade.  By 1915, the United States closed its consulate in Oman, and relations 
became intermittent until President Roosevelt invited Omani ruler Sayyid Sa’id bin 
Taymur to Washington, D.C., for a tour of the Capitol.79  During the 1950s, both 
countries codified relations by renewing the old economic treaty with additional 
provisions.  Both Oman and the United States accorded each other the right to send 
consular representatives to other’s respective country.  This move marked the beginning 
of a strategic relationship between the two. 
Throughout the 1970s, the United States laid the framework for creating access to 
Omani infrastructure.  U.S. State Department officials visiting Oman expressed interest in 
using an airstrip on the island of Masirah.  Under a 1975 bilateral agreement, the United 
States gave Oman tube-launched, optically tracked, wire guided missiles to bolster their 
defense against Yemen in exchange for access to Masirah.80  During the latter part of the 
1970s, the bilateral arrangement between Oman and the United States took on a distinctly 
political dimension.  One of the first indications that Oman would make a valuable ally 
was Sultan Qaboos’ support for Anwar Sadat during the Camp David peace talks when 
                                                 
79 Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World:  The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy 
(Santa Monica: Rand, 1995), 144. 
80 Ibid., 146. 
 39
Egypt recognized the legitimacy of Israel.  Moreover, the Iranian Revolution and Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan warranted the development of a task force to address these issues 
from within the region.  Under the Carter administration, the U.S. formed the modern-day 
U.S. Central Command.   
The most meaningful agreement thus far occurred in 1980, when Oman cemented 
an arrangement granting the United States access to several of its facilities.  Oman faced 
a dilemma.  On one hand, the Sultanate could not rely on its GCC neighbors to protect it 
against a potential aggressor.  On the other hand, conceding its security to the United 
States would inevitably lead to domestic opposition.  The agreement ultimately allowed 
the United States to curb Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean while granting Oman the 
economic and military assistance it needed to meet its domestic security requirements.  In 
order to facilitate the agreement, certain measures had to be put in place.  Contingencies 
on the agreement limited the scope of access the United States had to Oman and sought to 
minimize the U.S. footprint in Oman.  For example, during joint exercise Bright Star ’81, 
Sultan Qaboos ordered the United States to reduce the length of the exercise and quantity 
of those participating.  He also mitigated opposition by confining the U.S. footprint to 
unpopulated areas and forced U.S. personnel to wear civilian attire when working and 
traveling outside the base.  Ultimately, Qaboos concluded that Oman’s security interests 
and those of its Gulf neighbors would be best served by establishing a permanent 
arrangement with the United States. From the U.S. perspective, State Department 
officials asserted that “we could never secure the kinds of access in Saudi Arabia that we 
have negotiated in Oman.”81 
Throughout the 1980s, both countries solidified their position in the bilateral 
relationship.  While discussing relations with the United States, Sultan Qaboos asserted 
the following: 
It was not true that Oman gave the Americans bases in Masirah or 
elsewhere in the country.  All we gave was naval and airport facilities that 
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could be used upon request from the majority of the GCC countries, if 
they decided they were under a direct threat, which they could not repel 
with their own forces.82 
After reviewing the access agreement, Washington conducted more direct arms transfers 
to Oman and continued upgrades to its facilities and infrastructure.  The Iran Contra 
scandal tested the bilateral relationship for one of the first times, and not surprisingly, 
Oman appeared undeterred by the revelation that the United States at one time sold 
Stinger missiles to Iran.  Despite criticism from its Arab neighbors, Oman continued 
promoting peace talks with the Israelis.  Meanwhile, both countries tried to strike the 
delicate balance between achieving adequate security and mitigating domestic pressure 
and intra-GCC criticism. 
Operations Desert Shield and Storm reinforced the bilateral relationship between 
Oman and the United States.  Oman contributed to the coalition’s war effort by sending 
military troops to Saudi Arabia.  Additionally, the facilities agreement really materialized 
when Sultan Qaboos allowed U.S. military forces to access the pre-positioned equipment 
in Oman, use of the sea and air facilities, and overhead flight rights.  Some analysts argue 
that without Oman’s assistance, the rapid expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait would not have 
been possible.  Oman also provided significant assistance to the United States during 
Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.  Sultan Qaboos, however, conveyed his 
disapproval of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, citing it would cause revenge against the United 
States in the Arab world.  Perhaps his statement fed domestic consumption and earned 
him more credibility with his constituency.  A clear and particularly important lesson 
learned by examining U.S.-Omani cooperation efforts during GWOT operations is that 
both the Omani government and U.S. forces operating in Oman endured relatively little 
opposition from domestic forces despite perceptions that U.S. operations in Iraq also 
signified a threat toward Islam.83  The next section explores the rationale for the U.S. 
presence in Oman. 
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C. RATIONALE FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE  
Like Bahrain, Oman exhibits several attributes that make it the quintessential ally 
for the United States.  First, Oman’s strategic location along the Arabian Sea, Gulf of 
Oman, Strait of Hormuz, and its general proximity to Iran make the country militarily 
desirable to the United States.  U.S. forces hosted by Oman in the past have conducted 
several successful GWOT operations from staging areas within Oman’s borders.  Second, 
Oman’s Sandhurst educated leader, Sultan Qaboos, has earned names like “reformer on 
the throne” for his progressive thinking, advocacy of modernization and reform, tolerance 
of diversity, and tempered demeanor.  Oman’s foreign policy is largely reflective of 
Sultan Qaboos’ enlightenment and forward thinking.  In contrast to Bahrain’s King 
Hamad’s and Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah’s relatively short terms in power, Sultan 
Qaboos has led Oman for 37 years and established a long record as a measured leader.   
Third, Oman’s history as a tolerant seafaring nation exposed to diversity through trade 
has made its civil society more accepting of other societies and religions.  As a result, 
opposition in Oman is minimal.  Combined, these factors allow Oman to conduct its 
foreign policy relatively independently of manipulation, which leads to more effective 
U.S.–Oman relations. 
Located along the Arabian Sea with partial ownership of the Strait of Hormuz, 
Oman sits along one of the world’s most critical strategic intersections.  From Khasab 
Airfield, which borders the UAE and is located at the most northern part of Oman, it 
takes an aircraft about five minutes to reach the Strait of Hormuz; a merchant shipping 
lane through which a significant portion of the world’s oil exports pass.84  Perhaps more 
importantly, Khasab airfield is only a short 10-minute flight to Iran, a planning factor that 
could have enormous implications should Iran commit an act of aggression toward one of 
its neighbors.  In fact, a joint Omani–British naval station sits at Khasab to monitor all 
maritime traffic traveling through Hormuz.  The island of Masirah also constitutes a 
critical interest for the United States because of its improved 12,000-foot airstrip and 
updated infrastructure.  Thumrait Naval Air Base offers a facility for anti-submarine 
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patrol planes and the U.S. Air Force has access to Seeb International Airport, Oman's 
largest airport.  The United States has multiple stashes of prepositioned equipment 
located in various parts of the country and can use any of these locations with the proper 
clearance from the Oman government.  In exchange for the repetitive five-year renewals 
to the original facilities agreement, the United States provides upgrades to the jointly 
used facilities.85  Among the countries analyzed in this research, the common thread 
between all three is the strategic nature of the country’s location and where it sits relative 
to U.S. interests in the Gulf.  Bahrain and Oman, however, distinguish themselves from 
Saudi Arabia by way of commendable political and economic reform.  The next section 
will discuss the latter’s progress in this area under the rule of Sultan Qaboos. 
The message touted from American podiums in Washington on any given day 
talks of the benefits of spreading democracy and fighting terrorism with trade in the 
Middle East.  Oman’s ruler, Sultan Qaboos, has pursued these ideas vigorously, in a 
distinctly Omani way, for over 35 years.  His ambitious accomplishments include the 
building of modern infrastructure, universal education, a bicameral advisory council, and 
the initiation of a supreme court.  Overall, Qaboos has tirelessly fought to enfranchise his 
polity through religious and civil tolerance.86  The result is a secure nation capable of 
policing itself without the threat of significant opposition or internal conflicts.87  Like 
Bahrain, Oman’s progress in political liberalization signifies success from the U.S. 
standpoint. 
Drawing from his valuable experiences at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst 
in Great Britian, Qaboos implemented a policy of universal education for all Omanis.  
The proliferation of educational institutions throughout Oman and the availability of an 
education without respect to gender or religion is just one critical aspect of the country’s 
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endeavor to succeed in “Omanization.”88  The ruler also recognizes the challenges of 
globalization and has, therefore, implemented English language and information 
technology instruction in the schools and universities to better equip Omanis to meet 
those challenges.  While some Middle East countries have experienced the “brain drain” 
effect or a mass exodus of its skilled and educated workers, Qaboos believes that creating 
a “global Omani” will ultimately benefit Oman in the end even if Omanis leave to work 
in the global economy.89  
Oman’s government consists of an executive branch led by Qaboos, who serves 
as both Head of State and Head of Government, a bicameral advisory council with a 58-
member appointed upper chamber and an 83-member elected lower chamber, and a 
Supreme Court.90  In late 2002, the Interior Minister Sayyid Saud bin Ibrahim Al Busaidi 
announced that suffrage would be afforded to all Omanis who had reached the age of 21 
by January 1, 2003.91  In October 2003, roughly 25% of eligible voters turned out to cast 
ballots in elections that were deemed free and fair.92  By 2005, Qaboos expanded the 
State Council by 17 appointees to 58.  Of those serving on the State Council, nine are 
women.  Both the appointed and elected consultative bodies possess no real legislative 
powers, but they can devise solutions and implementation plans to economic and social 
problems.  Ultimately, Qaboos has final approval power over legislation.  Other notable 
political achievements include the inception of the “Basic Statutes of the State,” or 
Oman’s equivalency to a constitution.  This document guarantees Omanis basic rights 
like the freedom of religion while prohibiting others like government ministers serving as 
officers in private companies.  Cecil argues that Oman’s, “gradual reform, firmly rooted 
in local tradition can be implemented in a way that offers citizens an expanding role in 
managing the affairs of their country without opening the doors to uncontrollable political 
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and social pressures.”93  Indeed, Oman’s calculated political system makes the state an 
especially appealing ally to the United States.  Like Bahrain, Oman’s diverse economy 
also plays an integral part in the country’s stability. 
Currently, Oman anticipates the full depletion of its oil reserves within the next 
15–20 years.  In 1998, during an interview with Pat Lancaster, Sultan Qaboos talked 
about the prospects for Oman’s economy.94  He indicated that Oman’s economic 
diversification away from oil was a cornerstone policy to the Sultanate’s renaissance 
period.  For example, private companies in Oman built a $3 billion aluminum smelter in 
Sohar, a $1 billion petrochemical plant in Sohar, and a joint fertilizer plant with India to 
expand its private sector.  In an effort to open his country to foreign investment, Sultan 
Qaboos also directed the expansion of seaports like Raysut in order to reach agreements 
with shipping lines such as Maersk and Sealand.95  Oman recently improved its status as 
a tourism destination.  Projects such as the Barr Al Jisah resort and the Al Sawadi Beach 
draw high-end international luxury visitors to Oman.96  All of these measures paved the 
way for the U.S.-Oman FTA, which President Bush signed on January 19, 2006.  
Although highly symbolic due to the low levels of trade between the United States and 
Oman, the FTA’s significance lies in the fact that it is part of U.S.-proposed Middle East 
Free Trade Area initiative.  Supporters for the initiative generally argue that FTAs with 
Middle Eastern countries stimulate bilateral arrangements and ultimately contribute to the 
U.S. foreign policy goal of combating terrorism with trade.  The argument certainly holds 
true for Oman.  Critics, however, focus on sub-standard labor rights, labor law violations 
and abuses, and the potential for compromised security in U.S. ports.  Ultimately, Oman, 
like Bahrain, has proven that its economy possesses sufficient capacity to grow without 
the petrodollars that give similar Gulf countries the rentier effect.   
Perhaps one of Oman’s most distinguishing features—which makes it such an 
appealing ally to the United States—is its rich seafaring heritage and reputation for 
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tolerance and diversity.  Unlike Saudi Arabia, which is primarily land-locked, Oman has 
historically enjoyed interacting with multitudes of foreign people and their differing 
cultures and religions at its many ports along the coast.  As early as the seventeenth 
century, Oman and France conducted commercial maritime business.  This interaction 
generated a healthy curiosity and respect for the cultures, religions, and identities of 
others.  Today, one can encounter, “Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, 
Europeans, and Americans, all helping Oman maintain its infrastructure and its network 
of contacts with the world.”97   
Because the sea commerce relies on stability within Oman, Omanis are adept at 
policing their own citizens.  For the most part, Omanis are a nontransient population who 
are extremely intolerant of terrorism.  This is just one quality that makes Oman a suitable 
candidate for U.S. military presence.  Other characteristics, such as the fact Omanis 
consist of predominantly Ibadhi Muslims, a non-Sunni nor Shia sect, alleviates some of 
the sectarian issues United States military forces encounter elsewhere.  During a 
discussion with former Army Programs Chief at the U.S. Embassy in Muscat Oman, LTC 
Michael Ammons indicated that he thought most Omanis are open-minded toward U.S. 
objectives, but still view them with some degree of skepticism.98  Iran poses a constant 
threat, and therefore, Omanis still see the United States as a viable counterbalance to Iran.  
If the United States withdraws its security guarantee, Oman would have reason for 
significant concern.  Continuing to leverage the security guarantee and threat of Iran, 
however, may help the U.S. achieve its foreign policy objectives with Oman, especially 
in light of an ascendant Iran. 
D. OMAN’S DOMESTIC CONCERNS 
Despite the substantive security and trade relationship between the United States 
and Oman, U.S. presence in the country has steadily declined since the beginning of the 
Iraq War in 2001.  During Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. positioned 
approximately 4,300 U.S. personnel at three Omani air bases.  By the time Operation 
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Iraqi Freedom launched in 2003, the U.S. presence in Oman had fallen to 3,750 
personnel.  Estimates from a 2005 report indicate that only 26 U.S. military personnel 
remain in Oman today.99  While the reduction of the U.S. footprint in Oman is less clear 
than the withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, it still points to potential problems that could 
emerge during several crises scenarios, especially those with Iran.  Conversely, the troop 
reductions may be attributable to tactical reorganization and have little bearing on the 
Oman’s domestic situation.  This section explores some of the domestic issues that Oman 
faces with respect to its relationship with the United States and ultimately seeks ways to 
calibrate U.S. strategic requirements in Oman with its domestic political considerations.   
Overall, the domestic considerations of Oman are less transparent than Saudi 
Arabia’s or Bahrain’s.  What is known is that the Sultanate currently faces relatively little 
opposition from its people, mainly because of the personal leadership initiatives of Sultan 
Qaboos.  Qaboos faces relatively little domestic opposition as long he appears to rule 
justly and within Islamic norms .100  The opposition his regime has endured in the past 
under the rule of Qaboos’ father, however, emerged from the southern region of Dhofar, 
where groups like the People’s Liberation Front of Oman (PFLO), now the People’s 
Democratic Front of Oman (PDFO), and the Dhofar Liberation Front, sought to affect 
change through rebellion.101  Sultan Qaboos masterfully dedicated himself and his 
regime toward ending the rebellion and reintegrating Dhofar into the Sultanate.  
Ultimately, the opposition movement waned along with Arab nationalism, but the 
conflict left ill feelings toward Yemen, which Sultan Qaboos also managed to overcome 
with strategic initiatives of diplomacy.  His foresight in terms of social services and 
government subsidies allowed Qaboos to co-opt many of the rebels back into mainstream 
society.  As mentioned before, Sultan Qaboos has demonstrated a long history of 
carefully measured leadership that has resulted in minimal opposition.  
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Another domestic consideration for Oman, perhaps less apparent is its response to 
growing disaffection toward U.S. foreign policies with religion.  In 1994, the Qaboos 
government approved the building of the Sultan Qaboos religious university in Muscat.   
In an even more controversial move, the regime funded the building of the Sultan Qaboos 
Mosque near the capital.102  Either the Qaboos regime, like many other GCC states, is 
welcoming an era of Islamism, or more likely, is striving to achieve an omnibalancing act 
between its domestic and foreign policy goals while placating a growing number of 
disenfranchised citizens.  Unlike many of the other Gulf countries, however, Oman has 
remained relatively untouched by the vicious cycle of terrorism plaguing the others.  This 
is in part due to the predominance of the Ibadhi sect of Islam in Oman, a distinguishing 
feature that sets Oman apart from its Gulf neighbors.    
With its tenets closely linked to the Maliki Sunni school, Ibadhism rejects 
primogeniture succession and asserts that the leadership of Islam should 
be designated by an imam who is capable and elected by the people. In 
fact, both political and religious Ibadhi leadership is vested in an imam.103 
Still, it seems factional Ibadhi fundamentalists seek to impose the rule of Islamic 
jurisprudence over secular governmental affairs.  In a recent incident, Omani law 
enforcement authorities encountered between 100 and 300 “extremists” as they attempted 
to transport weapons intended to disrupt a cultural and trade festival in Muscat they 
believed was in violation of the Islamic law.104  As the situation unfolded, it turned out 
that only 31 offenders had been arrested and charged with various crimes.  All 31 
received jail sentences ranging from 20 years to one year.  Months later, Sultan Qaboos 
pardoned all 31.  Like the many other aspects of his domestic policies, Qaboos has 
tempered the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Oman with a moderate legal 
system and his individual leadership.  Omani expert Dr. Najardhan concludes that 
incidents with connotations of terrorism in Oman indicate a desire to change the status 
quo of the polity rather than invite a broader campaign of terrorism.105 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In sum, Sultan Qaboos’ personal leadership coupled with Oman’s diverse and 
tolerant society makes Oman one of the United States’ most effective partners.  Oman’s 
stable political system, relative lack of domestic opposition, and growing economic 
diversification make Oman equally suitable, if not more so, for U.S. military presence as 
Bahrain.  Inevitably, Sultan Qaboos’ rule will come to end and with that, the sustainment 
of Oman’s direction and progress becomes questionable.  Additionally, there is no clear 
line of succession behind Qaboos, and the Al Sa’id family in Oman is relatively weak 
compared to most other Gulf monarchy families.  In the event that the United States 
becomes engaged in conflict with Iran, the potential for an increased U.S. military 
presence in Oman is increasingly likely.  Unlike the faulty premises used for validating 
the prolonged U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia, a similar presence in Oman would arguably 
encounter far less resistance.   
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
With the U.S. in the midst of withdrawing from Iraq and potentially increasing its 
presence in Afghanistan, the decision to deploy additional U.S. troops to different 
conflicts remains among the highest U.S. national priorities and also ranks as one of the 
greatest concerns of the American public, Congress, and Presidential Administration.  
This thesis engages three crucial Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries from the 
lens of advancing U.S. national interests in the Persian Gulf.  It argues that GCC country 
political institutions that exercise more central power, over-reliance on an oil-driven 
economy, less political liberalization, and accommodation of fundamental Islam 
ultimately have less ability to make their own foreign policy decisions without external 
influences.  These four factors played a vital role in the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 
Saudi Arabia.  The countries that exhibited these factors to a lesser degree, however, 
seemingly make foreign policy decisions with less manipulation and therefore, are more 
accommodating to supporting a significant U.S. military footprint.  Each country 
examined has common strategic, social, economic, and political systems, but also unique 
aspects such as their individual leaders, which make them more or less attractive partners 
to the U.S.  U.S. policymakers, military planners, and commanders must properly 
understand the strategic effects of placing additional U.S. military forces in such a 
volatile part of the world.  Failing to understand the actors, political institutions, religious 
establishments, social structures, and economies not only makes deployed troops 
vulnerable to domestic opposition and terrorism, but also threatens to undermine the 
delicate bilateral arrangements on which the U.S. relies so heavily.  American 
policymakers and diplomats must vigorously work to secure and improve bilateral 
arrangements with GCC countries while cautiously setting the conditions for an improved 
and integrated GCC security regime. 
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B. RATIONALE FOR U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE GCC 
U.S. goals outlined in any number of national strategies for the Middle East 
present a tall order for the U.S. military, government agencies, and non-government 
agencies:  stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, defeat Al Qaeda terrorist 
networks, promote regional stability, and stop state actors from sponsoring terrorism.  
After six years of fighting, the U.S. still maintains over 100,000 troops in Iraq to preserve 
the costly security gains won in recent years.  The Iraq War, however, continues focus an 
inordinate amount of U.S. resources in a single area.  Meanwhile, Al Qaeda transnational 
terrorism proliferates from places like Yemen, while Iran still pursues WMDs and 
hegemonic ambitions, and instability threatens to spread over from the Horn of Africa.  
The GCC along with Iraq, Iran, and Yemen maintain approximately 84% of proven 
global oil reserves and one third of all proven natural gas reserves.106   Preserving the 
global flow of oil from the Gulf continues to fall in line with U.S. national interests and it 
has since before the Carter doctrine sought to curb external actors from jeopardizing the 
Gulf oil supply lines and continues to remain a priority today.107  The rationale for 
addressing current and future threats of terrorism, state aggression, and oil supply 
compels the U.S. to collaborate with the GCC.  
How this partnership with the GCC takes form and substance both at the 
individual and at the collective level sits at the center of this analysis.  Undeniably, 
advancing U.S. interests in the Gulf requires placing U.S. equities within geographic 
proximity of these countries in order to conduct operations.  The mere presence of 
thousands of U.S. forces in Muslim countries, however, presents a “rallying point for 
both domestic political opposition and terrorist groups, in particular Al Qaeda and its 
associated organizations.”108  The thesis argues that Oman and Bahrain make optimal 
bilateral partners for continued and expanded presence, while their larger and more 
powerful neighbor, Saudi Arabia, has become less appealing.  U.S. foreign policy still 
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places a heavy premium on bilateral arrangements.  The infusion and abundance of 
foreign military spending, free trade agreements, and exchange programs makes this one- 
on-one strategy clear.  Bilateral arrangements more than adequately address U.S. needs in 
the near term and the U.S. should continue to improve these arrangements to the greatest 
extent possible while U.S. military troops continue to fight terrorism in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Arguably though, the U.S. pursues these bilateral arrangements at the 
expense of promoting a more collective and comprehensive GCC regional security 
architecture.   As long as U.S. forces remain committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, the GCC 
countries individually possess valuable bargaining chips and leverage against America 
due to both wars’ vast supply demands.  Should they choose to terminate their respective 
basing and logistic agreements with the U.S., significant restructuring would have to 
occur.  Everything from housing major commands to supply chains, and the flow of 
personnel would be adversely affected.  Conversely, the noticeable absence of a security 
umbrella against Iran and other aggressors makes the smaller GCC countries vulnerable.  
As such, the bilateral agreements are ones of necessity.  Solely pursuing a bilateral 
approach with the GCC is not without its problems. 
Too much confidence placed on bilateral arrangements with individual Gulf 
countries suggests that the United States will indefinitely extend its external security 
guarantee as long as the country in question complies with U.S. requests for support.  
Policymakers work to foster and extend the bilateral arrangements with these countries 
instead of applying pressure on the GCC as a whole to undertake more substantive 
reforms in comprehensive security. After the first Gulf War, U.S. policymakers failed to 
see the implications of prolonged and over-reliant presence in Saudi Arabia.  Even with 
the majority of combat troops withdrawing from Iraq in 2009, decision makers now seem 
poised to repeat mistakes made eighteen years ago.  Once Iraq achieves a sustainable 
level of governance and security, the effect of continuing such a significant U.S. 
advisory, training, and counterterrorism footprint in the region will undoubtedly foster 
the same violence and anti-American sentiments seen in Saudi Arabia.  This places U.S. 
policymakers and military commanders in an unenviable dilemma:  minimize the U.S. 
footprint in the region and risk reversing the progress resulting from thousands of U.S. 
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lives lost and billions of tax payer dollars spent or place too many U.S. forces in the 
region and make them overly vulnerable to domestic terrorism in the Gulf countries.  
Intertwined with this dilemma are several complex concerns that affect how the GCC 
perceives internal and external threats.   
C. DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS OF THE GCC 
The relative lack of Peninsula Shield Force military power notwithstanding, the 
following issues are most worrisome to the GCC: aggressions from Iran, economic 
concerns driven by waning oil supplies, domestic discontent, and the propagation of 
Islamic radicalism.109  Much debate concerns these issues and whether or not the GCC is 
adequately prepared to face them in coming years. 
On the September 28, 2009, Iran test-fired a Shahab-3 ballistic missile; just three 
days before revealing that it owns a secret nuclear facility located in the side of a 
mountain near the city of Qom.  These outwardly defiant and aggressive acts serve to 
amplify the GCC’s threat perception of Iran and have so for many years. The primarily 
Sunni GCC countries see Iran’s military power and the export of Iranian Shiism to the 
GCC as a looming danger and continue to increase their own military armaments in 
response.  For example, GCC defense spending almost doubled from $71 billion to  
$146 billion between the periods of 1976–1980 and 1981–1985 due to the use of SCUDS 
during Iran and Iraq’s ongoing conflict.110   
Increased military spending alone is not sufficient to increase the GCC’s military 
supremacy.  Interoperability issues are problematic due to member countries’ wide-
ranging sets of bilateral arrangements that result in the purchase of aircraft, vehicles, 
weaponry, and technology from different allies.  Moreover, despite the GCC’s earnest 
military spending efforts, the member countries lack the political substance, will, and 
sophistication to create enough military power to back strong and independent foreign 
policies.  Seemingly, they are also unable to form a meaningful and coherent political 
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structure that would ostensibly provide policy objectives to a more significant military if 
one ever existed.  They opt rather for alliances of convenience based upon the countries 
that present them with the best proposals, oftentimes including basing rights or oil deals, 
and highlight these partnerships with high profile, but often superficial and unproductive 
joint military exercises.  Meanwhile, Iran’s offensive missile systems and navy continue 
to pose a daunting threat against GCC countries that lack the organization to respond with 
a similar capability.  Hence, the U.S. will likely remain the only viable Iran 
counterbalance for the near future. 
While several GCC countries such as Bahrain and Oman have shifted their 
economic policies toward liberalization because of diminishing oil supplies, Saudi Arabia 
has taken a much less progressive approach in moving to a post-rentier economy.  Due to 
Saudi Arabia’s massive oil reserves, premier status within the GCC, and lack of desire to 
diversify its economy, the de facto economic policy of the leading GCC member is to 
primarily rely on oil revenues to feed its gross domestic product.  One of the problems 
facing Saudi Arabia and by default, the rest of the GCC, is that several of the measures 
the other GCC members have taken to diversify their economies run contrary to the 
beliefs of the fundamental religious establishments in Saudi Arabia.  Unlike Oman who 
has made a concerted effort to increase tourism, inculcate technology, and broaden its 
industry base, Saudi Arabia has never seen the need.111  Saudi Arabia continues to face 
30% unemployment for men and 95% for women, little job growth, low wages, and a 
foreign labor dependency.112  The promulgation of a Wahabbist fundamentalist education 
for all Saudi students, enabled by the vast oil revenues, discourages creative and 
independent thinking that drives innovation.  Moreover, women, making up at least 50% 
of the population, are marginalized from almost all economic opportunity.113  
Unfortunately, the result is that despite individual efforts of smaller GCC members to 
diversify their economies, the GCC as a whole takes on a fragmented economic policy 
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driven by Saudi Arabia’s actions.  More importantly, the inability of Saudi Arabia to 
exercise independence from its religious establishment in economic decision-making has 
a profoundly negative effective on the GCC as a whole.  
As suggested above, domestic discontent affects each of the GCC countries in 
different ways.  The discontent faced by GCC countries in this analysis varies from overt 
protest in the liberal countries to a more lethal variety in Saudi Arabia.  Moreover, each 
of the countries generally exercises some types of measures to contain, suppress or 
mitigate the discontent—if they did not; it is unlikely they would still have monarchs.  In 
early 2009, riots broke out in Shi‘ite communities across Bahrain following the arrest of 
two Shi‘ite leaders of the opposition Haq Movement for Liberty and Democracy and a 
prominent anti-government Shi‘ite cleric.  The three were charged with incitement 
against the regime, although many alleged sectarian discrimination, as Sunni leaders 
within the Haq Movement were not targeted.114  The Amir of Bahrain later pardoned 178 
of the prisoners while 22 Shiite prisoners were being tried for destabilizing the regime.115  
In late 2008 and early 2009, Sultan Qaboos created a National Commission for Human 
Rights, altered Oman’s land laws to allow female ownership of residential land, and 
lowered the minimum land ownership age of women from 24 to 23.  He also outlawed 
human trafficking while establishing stiff penalties for perpetrators.  Saudi Arabia on the 
other hand, applies a much stricter approach.  Matruk al-Falah, a politics professor at 
King Saud University and campaigner for political rights, was released without charge 
after eight months in detention.  Falah was sentenced to seven years imprisonment in 
2005 for organizing a petition calling for a transformation of the Saudi political system 
into a constitutional monarchy.  King ‘Abdullah pardoned him later that year.116  Saudi 
Arabia also indicted 991 terrorist suspects in October 2008 after assessing that terrorist 
rehabilitation programs would not work and that it was more prudent to begin issuing 
death sentences.117  Indeed, the wide reactions of the different GCC countries to domestic 
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discontent make it difficult for the GCC to adopt a uniform approach toward addressing 
their populations.  Metrics for measuring discontent are unclear, but could potentially be 
quantified within sub-categories under “lethal” and “non-lethal” forms and further 
evaluated by analyzing acts of terror resulting in casualties, counting instances of public 
discontent in the media, and studying the amount of protests among many others.  
Ultimately, however, if the GCC hopes to attain some level of legitimacy, it needs to 
collectively find common ground and use like-minded approaches on major political and 
social issues.  GCC leaders must also collaborate to find effective ways to curb terrorism 
without alienating the rights of the people over which they rule. 
Unlike the other GCC countries, Al Qaeda enjoys a much larger support base in 
Saudi Arabia.  Clearly, the GCC should not adopt Saudi Arabia’s economic, civil, or 
religious policies.  It should, however, carefully note how Saudi Arabia has impressively 
combated Al Qaeda over the past six years and consider executing a similar 
counterterrorism strategy.  As Osama bin Laden orchestrated terrorism in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, he also set out to overthrow the Al Saud family and destabilize Saudi 
Arabia’s long-standing regime.  On May 12, 2003, multiple suicide bombers detonated 
car bombs in a Riyadh compound housing Western contractors.118  Terrorists later 
assassinated several Ministry of Interior officers and eventually launched an attack on the 
U.S. consulate in Jeddah.119  The regime quickly launched a comprehensive 
counteroffensive against Al Qaeda.  Secret police and forces targeted top operatives, 
many of whom had originated from Saudia Arabia.  Several Al Qaeda terrorists were 
captured or killed during raids on their safe houses and compounds.  Meanwhile, the 
regime underscored the kinetic targeting with the public release of the names of 
individuals they had targeted, captured, and killed.120  Senior Wahhabi clerics 
encouraged their followers to abandon jihad because it was an aberration of Wahhabism.  
The Ministry of Islamic Affairs also set up a rehabilitation program to reconcile captured 
                                                 
118 Bruce Riedel and Bilal Saab, “Al Qaeda’s Third Front:  Saudi Arabia,” The Washington Quarterly, 




terrorists and turn them into peaceful, law-abiding citizens.  The program was thought to 
be successful, although the recent indictment of 991 terrorists who had attended the 
rehabilitation program may indicate that the measure was too progressive for the regime 
or simply ineffective.  Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia thwarted several dozen terrorist plots 
while making significant progress in emerging technology like cyber-warfare.  
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has not only waged an effective counterterrorism campaign, 
but did it with no overt U.S. assistance—a factor which helped negate any criticism the 
regime’s opposition would have leveled against their efforts.  Similar initiatives 
throughout the GCC would arguably pay political dividends to the other monarchs.  
D. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Former Chief Economist at the Saudi American Bank, Kevin Tacker writes the 
following of the Saudi regime, “To lead effectively involves trying to bring harmony and 
balance to the diverse voices and needs of the kingdom’s natural constituencies.”  In 
essence, he highlights what each GCC monarch arguably struggles to accomplish 
between the country’s regime, people, and religious establishments every day.  Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, and Oman all underscore this sentiment, albeit in their own and differing 
ways.  The argument in this thesis lays the framework for understanding why some 
bilateral relationships with GCC countries are more advantageous to U.S. national 
interests than others.  Furthermore, the framework also facilitates foreign policy 
recommendations that allow policymakers to strike an appropriate balance between U.S. 
national interests and the social, economic, political, and religious phenomenon that 
historically make U.S. relationships in the Gulf so tumultuous.   
One theme that emerged throughout the research is the requirement to limit 
visibility of a significant U.S. footprint when operating in any GCC country.  Large U.S. 
footprints inevitably give domestic opposition the necessary ammunition to unduly 
influence their governments and leaders.  Identifying basing locations, supply depots, and 
airfields in rural areas of the Gulf countries allows the U.S. military to meet operational 
needs without drawing significant unwanted attention.  Similarly, it mitigates acts of 
terrorism against U.S. troops operating in Gulf countries.  Another idea is to increase the 
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allotment of military exchange officers between all the GCC countries and the United 
States.  The informal bonds between soldiers, sailors, and airmen of all nationalities 
engender trust and build longstanding relationships that transcend political and religious 
differences.  This concept also maximizes the effect of U.S. presence while minimizing 
the actual physical presence of U.S. forces.   
The U.S. continues to invest in arming the GCC’s military forces; however, the 
Peninsula Shield Force’s ability to advance militarily and technologically depends on 
uniform interoperability guidelines and military equipment acquisition processes.  
Without them, critical defense systems such as missile defense are vulnerable to failure.  
U.S. reinforcement of interoperability promotes more effective training exercises which 
improve military readiness—a foundational pillar to improving the GCC’s defensive 
capability.  A capable military is central to the GCC’s ambition of creating an effective 
security regime.  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Defense 
Community, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations all possess attributes the GCC 
could  replicate in their own regime. 
With respect to counterterrorism, Al Qaeda’s recent success in securing 
transnational safe havens such as Yemen has necessitated the need for effective 
counterterrorism strategies among all Gulf countries.  Saudi Arabia’s domestic victories 
against terrorism provide a model for the GCC and the other member countries to 
emulate.  The U.S. can assist by taking the Saudi framework for counterterrorism and 
building a curriculum that can be taught throughout the GCC with American assistance.   
The U.S. Armed Forces fundamentally changed after September 11, 2001.  The 
Building Partnership Capacity and the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap 
strategies highlight a critical need for cultural and language training for members of the 
Armed Forces.  Despite several initiatives to increase cultural awareness and train 
military members in critical foreign languages, the process is time consuming, the 
languages are difficult to learn, and institutional cultural knowledge takes years to 
acquire.  Additionally, Foreign Area Officers and the military’s other cultural and 
language experts are still critically short amongst the service branches.  It is imperative 
that these priorities are adequately funded and these officers are identified and trained 
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early in their careers in these critical disciplines.  Every measure must be taken to recruit 
and retain the Armed Forces’ cultural and language experts.   
At the strategic governance level, policymakers and diplomats need to understand 
that Gulf dynamics, as they exist today, are heavily influenced by individual rulers.  The 
rulers, who skillfully balance the competing demands of governance today, will end their 
rule in the near future.  As the younger Gulf populations continue to grow, the domestic 
pressures facing the regimes will also change.  Future Gulf leaders will govern mobile 
and diverse populations that are beginning to embrace technology and modernization.  
The proliferation of mass communication and technological pervasiveness throughout 
these countries beckons the young populations to question the logic behind a 
conservative, theological based education.  It is incumbent upon the United States to 
convey to its Gulf counterparts a distinct division between negative perceptions of 
modernity and the West and a liberal education emphasizing science, math, and social 
sciences.  A fundamental paradigm shift from a religious based education not only 
minimizes religious opposition to the regimes, but it creates a societal core that pursues 
private enterprise, seeks economic diversity, attracts foreign investment and ultimately 
leads to globalization.  Increasing academic exchange programs with the Gulf, fostering 
initiatives like the U.S.-Saudi-Joint Commission for Economic Cooperation in the GCC, 
and emphasizing the use of multilateral development banks will all help liberalize Gulf 
economies.   
Achieving equilibrium between U.S. interests in the Gulf and the multitude of 
concerns of Gulf leaders is an often illusive and seemingly unattainable goal.  The policy 
analysis and recommendations above lay the groundwork to improve upon existing 
bilateral relations while promoting enduring solutions for the whole GCC. Every 
initiative outlined herein requires that U.S. policy and decision makers understand the 
importance of Islam in each GCC country’s national identity and in its foreign policy 
decisions.  With a better core understanding of its Gulf partners and GCC as a whole, the 
U.S. can pave a landscape in the Gulf that will open dialogue, promote collective security 
and serve its national interests in the region for years come.   
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